This book traces how such a seemingly immutable idea as measurement proved so malleable when it collided with the subject matter of psychology. It locates philosophical and social influences reshaping the concept and, at the core of this reshaping, identifies a fundamental problem: the issue of whether psychological attributes really are quantitative. It argues that the idea of measurement now endorsed within psychology actually subverts attempts to establish a genuinely quantitative science and it urges a new direction. It relates views (...) on measurement by thinkers such as Holder, Russell, Campbell and Nagel to earlier views, like those of Euclid and Oresme. Within the history of psychology, it considers contributions by Fechner, Cattell, Thorndike, Stevens and Suppes, among others. It also contains a non-technical exposition of conjoint measurement theory and recent foundational work by leading measurement theorist R. Duncan Luce. (shrink)

Isaac explores how influential thinkers in the mid-twentieth century understood the relations among science, knowledge, and the empirical study of human affairs. He places special emphasis on the practical, local manifestations of their complex theoretical ideas, particularly the institutional milieu of Harvard University.

El presente trabajo desarrolla dos grandes objetivos. Por un lado, expone sintéticamente parte de la problemática filosófica y epistemológica del sujeto y del yo, mostrando la diversidad de conceptos y de genealogías históricas, así como parte de las controversias contemporáneas, elucidando preguntas y respuestas y apostando por vías no reduccionistas o simplificadoras. Por otro lado, se pretende solventar la paradoja de René Girard entre deconstrucción y reivindicación del sujeto, a través del yo del deseo de Jean-Michel Oughourlian y del paradigma (...) de la complejidad de Edgar Morin. (shrink)

The concept of empathy has received much attention from philosophers and also from both cognitive and social psychologists. It has, however, been given widely conflicting definitions, with some taking it primarily as an epistemological notion and others as a social one. Recently, empathy has been closely associated with the simulationist approach to social cognition and, as such, it might be thought that the concept’s utility stands or falls with that of simulation itself. I suggest that this is a mistake. Approaching (...) the question of what empathy is via the question of what it is for, I claim that empathy plays a distinctive epistemological role: it alone allows us to know how others feel. This is independent of the plausibility of simulationism more generally. With this in view I propose an inclusive definition of empathy, one likely consequence of which is that empathy is not a natural kind. It follows that, pace a number of empathy researchers, certain experimental paradigms tell us not about the nature of empathy but about certain ways in which empathy can be achieved. I end by briefly speculating that empathy, so conceived, may also play a distinctive social role, enabling what I term ‘transparent fellow-feeling’. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline two strands of evidence for the conclusion that the dynamical approach to cognitive science both seeks and provides covering law explanations. Two of the most successful dynamical models—Kelso’s model of rhythmic finger movement and Thelen et al.’s model of infant perseverative reaching—can be seen to provide explanations which conform to the famous explanatory scheme first put forward by Hempel and Oppenheim. In addition, many prominent advocates of the dynamical approach also express the provision of this (...) kind of explanation as a goal of dynamical cognitive science. I conclude by briefly outlining two consequences. First, dynamical cognitive science’s explanatory style may strengthen its links to the so-called “situated” approach to cognition, but, secondly, it may also undermine the widespread intuition that dynamics is related to emergentism in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

According to the realist interpretation, measurement commits us not just to the logically independent existence of things in space and time, but also to the existence of quantitatively structured properties and relations, and to the existence of real numbers, understood as relations of ratio between specific levels of such attributes. Measurement is defined as the estimation of numerical relations (or ratios) between magnitudes of a quantitative attribute and a unit. The history of scientific measurement, from antiquity to the present may (...) be interpreted as revealing a progressive deepening in the understanding of this position. First, the concept of ratio was broadened to include ratios between incommensurable magnitudes; second, the concept of a quantitative attribute was broadened to include non-extensive quantities; third, quantitative structure and its relations to ratios and real numbers were elaborated; and finally, the issue of empirically distinguishing between quantitative and non-quantitative structures was addressed. This interpretation of measurement understands it in a way that is continuous with scientific investigation in general, i.e., as an attempt to discover independently existing facts. (shrink)

The thesis that numbers are ratios of quantities has recently been advanced by a number of philosophers. While adequate as a definition of the natural numbers, it is not clear that this view suffices for our understanding of the reals. These require continuous quantity and relative to any such quantity an infinite number of additive relations exist. Hence, for any two magnitudes of a continuous quantity there exists no unique ratio. This problem is overcome by defining ratios, and hence real (...) numbers, as binary relations between infinite standard sequences. This definition leads smoothly into a new definition of measurement consonant with the traditional view of measurement as the discovery or estimation of numerical relations. The traditional view is further strengthened by allowing that the additive relations internal to a quantity are distinct from relations observed in the behaviour of objects manifesting quantities. In this way the traditional theory can accommodate the theory of conjoint measurement. This is worth doing because the traditional theory has one great strength lacked by its rivals: measurement statements and quantitative laws are able to be understood literally. 1 This paper was completed in 1990-1. while the author was a visiting scholar at the Irvine Research Unit in Mathematical Behavioral Sciences. University of California. Irvine. The author wishes to thank the Director. Professor R. D. Luce, for the generous provision of space and facilities within the Unit and for his critical comments upon some of the ideas expressed herein: Professor L. Narens. for his trenchant criticisms: and the University of Sydney, for granting Special Study Leave and financial assistance to make the visit possible. (shrink)

It has become customary to locate the origins of modern measurement theory in the works of Helmholtz and Hölder. If by ‘modern measurement theory’ is meant the representational theory, then this may not be an accurate assessment. Both Helmholtz and Hölder present theories of measurement which are closely related to the classical conception of measurement. Indeed, Hölder can be interpreted as bringing this conception to fulfilment in a synthesis of Euclid, Newton, and Dedekind. The first explicitly representational theory appears to (...) have been Russell's. He rejected the traditional concept of quantity and its connection to number, making the use of number in quantitative science problematical. He solved the problem via representationalism. (shrink)

Human rights may feel self-apparent to us, but less than 80 years ago, one of the most advanced countries at the time acted based on an utterly contrary ideology. The view of social Darwinism that abandoned the idea of the intrinsic value of human lives instead argued that oppression of the inferior is not only inevitable but desirable. One of the many catastrophic outcomes is the medical data obtained from inhuman experiments at concentration camps. Ethical uncertainty over whether the resulting (...) insights should be a part of the medical literature provides a chance to consider the seemingly irreplaceable social construct of human dignity. Would any medical benefit justify the utilization of this illicit data? Would utilization even qualify as an insult to the dignity of the exploited subjects, or is this a question about intersubjective meaning? This work discusses the wisdom in blind adherence to human dignity, the possibility of retrospective insults, moral complicity, contrary viewpoints, and possible resolutions. (shrink)

Esta investigación se emprende motivada por la necesidad de desentrañar la progresión delos modelos de aprendizaje, los cuales se han ido adaptando para responder a las demandas de lasociedad en su dinámica constante de fluctuación y transformaciones. El objetivo de este trabajo es examinar de forma sistemática la evolución de los modelos de aprendizaje, destacando los cambios paradigmáticos que han favorecido la transición de enfoques de aprendizaje tradicionales hacia propuestas más innovadoras y transdisciplinarias. Para lograrlo, se lleva a cabo un (...) análisis bibliográfico apoyado en el método hermenéutico para la interpretación contextual de la literatura y los discursos, a fin de desentrañar las complejidades inherentes en la evolución de los modelos de aprendizaje. Los resultados resaltan la influencia limitante del paradigma de la simplicidad en laformación educativa tradicional y la necesidad de un giro hacia la dialogicidad y la colaboración eintegración disciplinaria para avanzar hacia la complejidad. Se concluye argumentando a favor de la adopción del paradigma de la complejidad, abogando por una epistemología transdisciplinariay un enfoque de aprendizaje interestructurante, que permitan el desarrollo humano integral.El reconocimiento de la complejidad humana en la enseñanza y el aprendizaje exige una transformación radical de la educación hacia prácticas más holísticas y transformadoras, esenciales para construir una sociedad equitativa y justa. (shrink)

By titling his paper “Slowing the Slide Down the Slippery Slope of Medical Assistance in Dying: Mutual Learnings for Canada and the US,” Daryl Pullman, an esteemed medical ethicist, uses a rhetoric...

El presente trabajo de investigación tiene como objeto el estudio de la legislación penal en la República de Colombia desde 1890 hasta la actualidad con la ley 599 de 2000, este último conocido como el vigente Código Penal. Lo anterior, conforme a la siguiente pregunta problémica ¿se ha dado un desarrollo oportuno de la legislación penal colombiana que otorgue soluciones fehacientes a las necesidades de una política criminal sólida desde sus inicios hasta la actualidad? Con ello, se pretende analizar las (...) diversas escuelas que han influido en los legisladores a la promulgación y tipificación de los delitos y sus penas en el marco jurídico penal colombiano. Se destaca ante todo, el análisis que a lo largo del desarrollo del ordenamiento jurídico colombiano abarca el contexto constitucional, doctrinal y jurisprudencial, los cuales, han logrado evidenciar el carácter de un óptimo “derecho penal” a lo largo del contexto histórico del país en mención. Se destaca así, la gran influencia de las Escuelas Clásica, Positivista y Finalista, que a hoy han venido a establecerse con fuerza en Colombia a lo largo de su codificación, desde 1980 hasta la actual ley 599 del año 2000. (shrink)

Bayesian conceptions of evidence have been invoked in recent arguments regarding the existence of God, the hypothesis of multiple physical universes, and the Doomsday Argument. Philosophers writing on these topics often claim that, given a Bayesian account of evidence, our existence or something entailed by our existence (perhaps in conjunction with some background knowledge or assumption) may serve as evidence for each of us. In this paper, I argue that this widespread view is mistaken. The mere fact of one's existence (...) qua conscious creature cannot serve as evidence on the standard Bayesian conception of evidence because knowledge of one's existence is a necessary part of the background knowledge relative to which all epistemic probabilities are defined. It follows that some formulations of the fine-tuning argument (for theism or a multiverse), the argument from consciousness (for theism) and a rejoinder to the Doomsday argument are mistaken. (shrink)

: This paper addresses the need to examine teaching practices from the observation that they are beyond what they should be. This task devolved to scientists of education is to learn about teaching practices in their relationship to student learning in order to build the database useful to teacher educators and reflexivity necessary for any teacher about their own practice. The concepts of competence, pattern and are useful instrument in this endeavor of explanation and understanding of the practices. The proposed (...) theoretical framework is illustrated by a perspective of teaching practices of teachers in schools and colleges. These differ in many aspects and this requires the testing of new hypotheses to explain -/- La présente contribution traite de la nécessité d’étudier les pratiques d’enseignement à partir du constat de ce qu’elles sont au delà de ce qu’elles devraient être. Cette tâche dévolue aux chercheurs en sciences de l’éducation vise à mieux connaître les pratiques d’enseignement dans leurs relations aux apprentissages des élèves afin de constituer la base de données utiles aux formateurs d’enseignants et nécessaire à toute réflexivité des enseignants à propos de leur propre pratique. Les notions de compétence, de schème et d’instrument sont utiles à cette entreprise d’explication et de compréhension des pratiques. La proposition de cadrage théorique est illustrée par une mise en perspective des pratiques d’enseignement de professeurs des écoles et de collèges. Celles-ci se distinguent sur bien des aspects ce qui réclame la mise à l’épreuve de nouvelles hypothèses explicatives. (shrink)

Je rappelle ici l’une des plus constantes préoccupations de la pensée de Jean-Luc Nancy : celle du destin d’un Occident qui, au moment même où il paraît accomplir son élargissement au monde entier, est amené à faire, de plus en plus, le constat de son propre effacement, de son déclin, ou de sa finitude. Je le fais tout en déplaçant quelque peu le point de vue d’où le problème se pose « normalement » car, comme c’est arrivé maintes fois dans (...) mes échanges avec Nancy lui-même, j’y fais jouer mon écart, ou mon arrabal hispanique. (shrink)

The "aphoristic form causes difficulty," Nietzsche argued in 1887, for "today this form is not taken seriously enough." Nietzsche's Aphoristic Challenge addresses this continued neglect by examining the role of the aphorism in Nietzsche's writings, the generic traditions in which he writes, the motivations behind his turn to the aphorism, and the reasons for his sustained interest in the form. This literary-philosophical study argues that while the aphorism is the paradigmatic form for Nietzsche's writing, its function shifts as his thought (...) evolves. His turn to the aphorism in Human, All Too Human arises not out of necessity, but from the new freedoms of expression enabled by his critiques of language and his emerging interest in natural science. Yet the model interpretation of an aphorism Nietzsche offers years later in On the Genealogy of Morals tells a different story, revealing more about how the mature Nietzsche wants his earlier works read than how they were actually written. This study argues nevertheless that consistencies emerge in Nietzsche's understanding of the aphorism, and these, perhaps counter-intuitively, are best understood in terms of excess. Recognizing the changes and consistencies in Nietzsche's aphoristic mode helps establish a context that enables the reader to navigate the aphorism books and better answer the challenges they pose. (shrink)

In his review of Charles Spearman’s The Nature of ‘Intelligence’, R. G. Collingwood launched an attack upon psychometrics that was expanded in his Essay on Metaphysics. Although underrated by friend and foe alike, Collingwood’s critique identified a number of defects in the thinking of psychometricians that subsequently became entrenched. However, his main complaint was that psychology generally was a ‘fashionable scientific fraud’. This charge was inspired by his more general views on logic and metaphysics, which, however, as I argue, are (...) logically unsustainable. Ironically, other elements of his philosophy – his ‘fallacy of calculation’ and concept of ‘scale of forms’ – are relevant to psychometrics and tip the scales in favour of his otherwise unwarranted charge. (shrink)

Deonna and Teroni’s The Emotions is both an excellent introduction to philosophical work on emotions and a novel defence of their own Attitudinal Theory. After summarising their discussion of the literature I describe and evaluate their positive view. I challenge their theory on three fronts: their claim that emotions are a form of bodily awareness, their account of what makes an emotion correct, and their account of what justifies an emotion.

As an aspiring science in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, psychology pursued quantification. A problem was that degrees of psychological attributes were experienced only as greater than, less than, or equal to one another. They were categorised as intensive magnitudes. The meaning of this concept was shifting, from that of an attribute possessing underlying quantitative structure to that of a merely ordinal attribute . This fluidity allowed psychologists to claim that their attributes were intensive magnitudes and measurable . This (...) claim was supported by an argument that order entails quantity. As adapted by psychometricians, the argument was that if an attribute is ordered, then the differences between its degrees are quantitative and, therefore, measurable. However, in a paper ignored in psychology for six decades, the issue was resolved mathematically and the resolution implies that the psychometricians’ argument was fallacious. (shrink)

With the renaissance of political realism has come an insistence that the study of politics be historically located. While many political realists trace their conception of historical inquiry to Thucydides, this article shows how Herodotus can offer a more realist approach to political phenomena. Herodotus crafts a self-conscious form of historical inquiry that foregrounds the actual activity of the historian as intersubjective, reflective, and particular. Herodotus thus models a historical investigation that shows its own limits while demanding the evaluation of (...) its readers, offering a way to address criticisms of political realism’s singular and unacknowledged historical narratives. Moreover, Herodotus’s Histories exemplify a disposition toward open inquiry among others—what Herodotus calls wonder—that can invigorate responsive curiosity as part of the project of historical understanding essential to both political realism and contemporary democracies. (shrink)

Among the topics discussed in Thomas Kuhn'sThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions, those of education, training, and pedagogy are apt to seem the least compelling. Certainly, the earliest debates aboutStructurefocused on other, more controversial, matters: incommensurability, meaning change, the rationality of theory choice, normal science—the list goes on. Over the past two decades, however, a growing concern among historians and sociologists of science with the nature of scientific apprenticeship has stimulated greater appreciation of the importance of questions of teaching and learning (...) to the philosophical position sketched inStructure. This paper seeks to develop further our understanding of these issues as they bear on Kuhn's theory of science. (shrink)

I argue for the view that some we-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification (IEM) relative to the first-person plural pronoun. To prepare the ground for this argument I defend an account of the semantics of ‘we’ and note the variety of different uses of that term. I go on to defend the IEM of a certain range of we-thoughts against a number of objections.

Analyzes the eighteenth-century French philosopher's writings about women, sexuality, and the family, and suggests that Rousseau's philosophy is not misogynous.

The transition from the traditional to the representational theory of measurement around the turn of the century was accompanied by little sustained criticism of the former. The most forceful critique was Bertrand Russell''s 1897 Mind paper, On the relations of number and quantity. The traditional theory has it that real numbers unfold from the concept of continuous quantity. Russell''s critique identified two serious problems for this theory: (1) can magnitudes of a continuous quantity be defined without infinite regress; and (2) (...) can additive relations between such magnitudes exist if magnitudes are not divisible? The present paper shows how the traditional theory answers these questions and compares the traditional and representational theories as contributions to our understanding of the logic of application. (shrink)

I argue here that Weberian disenchantment is manifest in the triumph of instrumental reason and the expansion of analytic enquiry, which now dominates not simply those sciences upon which medicine depends, but medical practice itself. I suggest ways that analytic enquiry, also referred to here as anatomical reasoning, are part of a particular ideology—a way of seeing, speaking about, and inhabiting the world—that often fails to serve the health of patients because it is incapable of “seeing” them in the moral (...) sense described by Iris Murdoch and others. I use the work of James Elkins and Wendell Berry to call for the recovery of a way of seeing the human body as both other and more than an object of scientific enquiry and social control. (shrink)

We examined effects of exposure to unreportable images of spiders on approach towards a tarantula. Pretests revealed awareness of the stimuli was at chance. Participants high or low on fear of spiders were randomly assigned to receive computer-generated exposure to unreportable pictures of spiders or outdoor scenes. They then engaged in a Behavioral Approach Task with a live tarantula. Non-fearful participants completed more BAT items than spider-fearful individuals. Additionally, as predicted, a significant interaction = 5.12, p < .03) between fear (...) of spiders and stimulus demonstrated that spider-fearful participants exposed to spiders completed more BAT items than spider-fearful participants exposed to control stimuli . The findings support the hypothesis that exposure to unreportable feared stimuli promotes approach towards the feared object. Future research and clinical implications were discussed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Avner de Shalit argues that political philosophy centrally involves political persuasion, defined as a process of mutual empathy that involves more than just providing rationales or normative arguments. Building upon this idea of political persuasion as mutual empathy, de Shalit thinks that to engage the public, philosophers need to examine problems from the public’s perspective, and not a perspective unique to their professional group. In this paper, I argue that de Shalit’s conception of political persuasion is overly narrow. In (...) its place, I argue for a more pluralistic approach to understanding political persuasion. (shrink)

This paper draws a distinction between two possible understandings of the DEEDS (Dynamical, Embodied, Extended, Distributed and Situated) approach to cognition. On the one hand, the DEEDS approach may be interpreted as making a metaphysical claim about the nature and location of cognitive processes. On the other hand, the DEEDS approach may be read as providing a methodological prescription about how we ought to conduct cognitive scientific research. I argue that the latter, methodological, reading shows that the DEEDS approach is (...) pursuitworthy independently of an assessment of the truth of the metaphysical claim. Understood in this way, the DEEDS approach may avoid some of the objections that have been levelled against it. (shrink)

The standard interpretations of Foucault's intellectual biography usually present Sartre as his major adversary. Though it would be difficult to underestimate the importance of Sartre for Foucault's development, this paper argues that Foucault was involved in an even more intense and deeper contest with Freud. Indeed, Freud was Foucault's principal adversary and, throughout his career, Foucault was trying to formulate a counter-project to psychoanalysis. The author attempts to demonstrate this claim by examining Foucault's early psychological writings, Madness and Civilization, his (...) encounter with Kant in The Order of Things and The History of Sexuality. He argues, moreover, that Foucault had articulated a project, namely, 'the dialogue with unreason', which not only could have provided a meeting point for his project and Freud's but can still provide a way of getting beyond the exhausted debate between the advocates of the Enlightenment and the Anti-Enlightenment. Because he could never give up the temptation to valorize transgression, however, Foucault was unable to pursue the dialogue with unreason in a systematic way. Key Words: Foucault • Freud • psychoanalysis • reason. (shrink)